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Abstract:  In this article I investigate to what extent European Integration stimulates policy 
convergence and diffusion of various forms of tax policy. Using a mixed-methods design, I find 
that several causal mechanisms contribute to an EU-wide diffusion of tax policies: imposition, 
competition, harmonization and learning/communication. I show that these mechanisms have 
different effects on different forms of taxation. Even if the ultimate outcome of this influence 
only in few cases leads to unconditional convergence, the EU has markedly accelerated policy 
diffusion among its member states. 
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Introduction: The Diffusion and Convergence of Tax Policies in the EU 
 
From their very beginning the European Communities have generated the suspicion that they 
accelerate the convergence and diffusion of national tax policies. Recent research has rekindled 
this suspicion for some areas of taxation. Although the overall effect is still limited, the 
compound effect of the European Union (EU) has accelerated the competition around corporate 
income (Genschel et al., 2008). But competition is not the only way EU institutions shape 
national tax systems. In some respects it may not even be a major way. To name but a few 
examples: the EU acquis communautaire indirectly transforms national income taxation 
guaranteeing stable investment conditions abroad; the EU adopts legislation to harmonize the 
system of European consumption taxes; the European Court of Justice (ECJ) produces case law 
that reaches deeply into the sovereignty of national tax policy makers; EU soft law spurs 
processes of learning and of shaming harmful tax practices (Kemmerling and Seils 2009 fc; 
Radaelli and Kraemer 2008). All in all, the EU disposes of a full arsenal of measures to shape 
national tax systems.  
 
Hence, I should expect the EU to have a noticeable impact on national tax systems. This 
hypothesis squares with two important contradictory facts: First, the EU has no direct 
competences in taxation itself. Taxation is still a national domain, and decisions on tax issues are 
still subject to the unanimity rule of voting in the Council. It is therefore no wonder that in terms 
of primary legislation, taxation is one of the least dynamic areas. Second, we do not see much 
policy convergence on the aggregate level of tax ratios or the size of the tax state (Garrett 1998; 
Genschel 2002a).  
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To see how the EU affects national tax policies one has to disaggregate total taxation into 
specific areas of taxation, in which EU policy makers directly intervene. For this purpose I look 
more deeply into direct taxes (corporate and personal income) and indirect taxes (general 
consumption taxes and excises). I use several different indicators of taxation (rates, ratios and 
qualitative properties). This disaggregation gives us a more fine-grained, nuanced picture of how 
the EU affects national tax systems. In fact, I find evidence for all major mechanisms at work, at 
times even in interaction with each other. But these mechanisms do not work out in equal ways 
for each form of taxation. Moreover, we see that even if the overall outcome is not always 
unconditional convergence, the EU has markedly accelerated international policy diffusion 
among its member states. 
 
This paper starts with a brief and selective overview of the literature on international policy 
diffusion and convergence. The next section reports on EU activities in the four fields of 
taxation. The following section presents some quantitative and qualitative information of 
international policy convergence for the four fields. I compare the evolutions of tax indicators of 
core EU countries with selected non-EU OECD countries and judge how far the available 
evidence is consistent with different causal mechanisms of policy convergence. The next section 
tests the diffusion of national tax policies within the EU using a spatial-econometrics approach. 
The final section concludes. 
 
 
 
Causal Mechanisms of International Policy Convergence and Diffusion 
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In recent years there has been a remarkable renaissance in studies about international policy 
convergence and diffusion (Holzinger and Knill 2005; Meseguer 2005; Simmons et al., 2006). 
Whereas convergence is easily defined as increasing cross-country similarities in policy outputs, 
diffusion needs more conceptual work. In natural sciences, diffusion usually means a spread of 
particles in random motion over space. In social sciences it has been used to describe a 
‘transition in country A [that] increases the probability of a transition in country B’ (Elkins and 
Simmons 2004: 2). In this general form, it is obvious that diffusion does not imply convergence: 
even if countries affect each other, they do not need to copy the same policy from each other. 
There is a large variety of theoretical explanations and approaches aiming at an explanation of 
convergence and diffusion. Holzinger and Knill (2005), for instance, focus on the following four 
(groups of) causal mechanisms: imposition, harmonization, competition, and transnational 
communication.  
 
The paradigmatic case of imposition is when the IMF or the World Bank gives a conditional loan 
to countries on condition of their compliance with some established rules (Meseguer 2006). 
Coercion and the exercise of political power are of defining importance for this mechanism 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). Delegation of legal powers and the judicialization of policy fields 
can endow international organization with enough authoritative power to impose rules and 
sanction nation states behavior (Zangl 2005). If this authoritative power is used to impose similar 
decisions and rulings on many or all states, the result is an overall convergence of policies. 
 
International harmonization may also rest on the existence of internationally binding norms and 
of international institutions that monitor their implementation. However, harmonization always 
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presupposes some degree of (voluntary) cooperation between nation states. Countries must have 
to agree on the cooperation in a specific policy area. Compared to imposition, harmonization 
and, more generally, international cooperation should be interpreted not as hierarchically, but as 
horizontally negotiated adjustments in national policies (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996).  
 
In contrast, regulatory competition stems from the absence of international cooperation or any 
hierarchical forms of imposition. Countries are expected to converge because of the strategic 
incentives to over- or underbid other countries’ policies. In strong notions of regulatory 
competition, this may lead to a race to the bottom in legal standards (Sinn 2001), but there are 
also examples of jurisdictional competition which lead to a race to the top (Vogel 1995). 
Regulatory competition can also take many forms. If, for instance, voters have imperfect 
knowledge about good policies, they may use policy levels of other countries as a source of 
information. This leads to so-called yardstick competition between countries (Besley and Case 
1995). Moreover, not all countries may face similar strategic incentives. For instance, it has been 
argued that only small countries have a genuine incentive to cut tax rates, since the revenue 
losses in their national tax base are marginal compared to the inflows of foreign tax base (Kanbur 
and Keen 2001). It has also been argued that countries with stronger financial sectors have an 
additional incentive to attract foreign capital (Holzinger 2005). Either way one should not expect 
an absolute convergence of tax policies, but rather a conditional convergence for groups of 
countries of similar size or with similar financial sectors (Ganghof 2006b). The flipside of this 
argument is that diffusion between heterogeneous countries leads to ‘negative’ copying and even 
divergence. 
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The last causal mechanism, transnational communication or learning, accommodates many 
different forms, such as naïve emulation of other countries’ policies or different versions of 
policy learning (Hall 1993; Radaelli 2000). Countries may emulate each other as a consequence 
of ‘collective herd behavior’ or global intellectual trends. They may use other countries’ 
performance to judge the efficacy of policies, adopt successful innovations, and reform policy 
failures (Meseguer 2006). If this is the case, countries not only learn from their own experience, 
but also from the experiences of other countries (Volden et al., 2008). Other versions of this 
causal mechanism focus on the role of epistemic communities and transnational problem solving 
which goes beyond bilateral learning exercises (Haas 1992). 
 
EU scholars have used varieties of the four causal mechanisms to explain the integration or 
convergence of various policy fields in the EU. The impact and limits of legal imposition on 
nation states is a widely studied topic (Boerzel 2006; König 2007). The ‘disciplinary function’ of 
membership in the European Monetary Union (EMU) has been observed for fiscal and income 
policies in the EU (Enderlein 2006). Coordination and harmonization can be observed in most 
areas of (product market) regulation (Scharpf 1999). Various authors argue that economic 
competition is now the driving force for EU policy making and has deep repercussions on the 
national level (but cf. Majone 2005). Finally, recent initiatives by EU institutions have created a 
cottage industry of investigation for new modes of governance. In particular EU soft law and the 
open method of coordination are supposed to facilitate cross-national learning and convergence 
(De La Porte and Nanz 2004). Learning has been singled out as one of the key reasons for EU-
wide policy transfer and convergence (Radaelli 2005).  
 
 Kemmerling, “EU’s Influence on National Tax Systems,” ACES Cases 2011.1, p. 8 
Applying these different mechanisms to specific research questions is not always 
straightforward, however (Kemmerling 2008; Volden et al., 2008). The boundaries of the four 
mechanisms are blurred. A lot of learning is done strategically along the lines of competitive 
pressures and harmonization can be frozen into imposition. Some of these causal claims yield 
very similar empirical observations on an aggregate level of cross country comparisons. For 
instance, it is empirically very difficult to distinguish voluntary from coercive agreement since 
the notion of power is a very elusive (cf. Kemmerling 2007). Bearing these caveats in mind, the 
four mechanisms are still important means to understand the role of the European Union in its 
influence on national tax policies.  
 
 
 
Taking Stock of EU Activities in Tax Policies 
 
According to many EU scholars, the EU impact on national tax policies seems to be fairly 
limited (e.g. Moravcsik 2002). There is no evidence for an absolute convergence of tax levels in 
the EU or the OECD (Seils 2007). Tax policy has remained one of the few policy areas that have 
remained under the control of national jurisdiction and the direct impact on national tax policy 
making seems to be severely limited by the principle of unanimity and the small size of the EU 
budget. However, it is easy to show that the EU has continuously expanded its influence on 
national tax policies using a battery of indirect and direct measures (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 
2010). 
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Some of the activities of the EU which were not designed to affect tax policies can have a 
dramatic impact on national tax policy making. A complete list of these indirect activities  
is beyond the scope of this paper, but some important examples suffice to show this. First, EU 
market integration has powerful spillover effects on national tax systems. Enhancing the flow of 
goods and services affects national tax bases of consumption and labor, as well as the structure 
of the tax system. Second, the integration of capital markets and the adoption of a common 
currency strongly accelerate capital flows within the EU with direct implications for national 
income taxation. Third, the adoption of the acquis communautaire by new member states 
guarantees stable political and economic institutions, such as property rights and access to legal 
systems. Together with stable or predictable exchange rates this greatly reduces risks to investing 
abroad. This makes flows of capital between member states much easier and severely affects the 
national system of capital taxation (Kemmerling and Seils 2009). 
 
Despite the high legal thresholds for direct action on the intergovernmental level, EU institutions 
have been remarkably active in the field of tax policies. Table 1 gives evidence for the three 
types of direct activities of the Commission, the Council and the ECJ: (1) ‘information’ contains 
activities such as recommendations, opinions and resolution, but also important communications 
and influential reports. These measures have in common that they are not legally binding, but 
that they provide important focal points for cooperative efforts and subsequent rounds of 
negotiations on legally binding initiatives, (2) ‘legislation’ contains all activities with legally 
binding character, in particular directives and regulations; (3) ‘jurisprudence’ contains court 
rulings with  direct relevance for national tax policies.  
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Beginning with the first category, information, one sees an ‘explosion’ of activities in the area of 
tax policies in recent decades. More importantly, there is an obvious shift from information 
exchange on excise taxation in the beginning, to VAT in the 1970s and to corporate income 
taxation (CIT) in recent years. Most exchange of information takes place in the form of reports 
and recommendations of the Commission to other organs of the EU, such as the Council or the 
Parliament. Legislative acts consist of decisions, regulations and directives in the field of tax 
policy. With some 60 percent of all legal acts, decisions are by far the most common form. The 
overwhelming part of legal acts deal with indirect taxation, but in recent years there have been a 
few, but noticeable legal activities in corporate and personal income taxation. The activities of 
the ECJ primarily consist of preliminary rulings, and to a lesser extent, of infringement 
procedures (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2010). Again, most activities are found in the realm of 
indirect taxation, but in recent years more and more cases of direct taxation are brought to the 
court. In comparative terms, direct taxation seems to be driven by court rulings and informative 
activities of the EU, whereas legislation also has a substantive quantitative dimension in indirect 
taxation.  
 
  
Evidence of Tax Policy Convergence: EU vs. OECD 
 
Are these activities strong enough to substantially affect national tax-policy making? Since there 
is little reason to expect evidence for absolute policy convergence in the size of the tax state, one 
has to dig a little deeper into the tax structure and composition of taxation. For this purpose we 
need to distinguish between different forms of taxation and different tax indicators. I focus on 
major tax forms only, i.e. corporate (CIT) and personal (PIT) income taxation for direct taxes, 
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and general consumption taxes (usually VAT) and excises as the major indirect taxes. I will 
compare nominal tax rates, tax-to-GDP ratios and qualitative indicators of the tax system and use 
simple statistical indicators such as the mean and the standard deviation.
1
 I will track the changes 
of these indicators across time for some 25 years. To sort out effects of Europeanization from 
general effects of globalization (Verdier and Breen 2001) I compare long-standing EU members 
(EU-10)
2
 with OECD countries that have never become EU member states (OECD-11).
3
  
 
 
Corporate Income Taxation 
 
Some trends in corporate income taxation (CIT) are related to genuinely international reasons. 
CIT is an area in which global competition should matter: the tax base of incorporated firms is 
mobile, its key agents, multinational firms, are versatile optimizers of international tax arbitrage 
(Devereux et al., 2008; Ganghof 2000; Slemrod 2004). CIT is also subject to major intellectual 
and ideological trends that are not confined to the EU (Swank 2006). An example is the trend in 
OECD countries towards cutting rates and broadening the tax base (Loretz 2008). Moreover, the 
EU treaty provides little guidance in the field of income taxation (Cnossen 2001), since it 
mentions income taxes only in as far as they interfere with the goal of a functioning single 
market. In fact, EU history is full of failed initiatives to coordinate or harmonize tax rates and tax 
bases. As early as 1962 the Commission experimented with the idea of a harmonization of the 
effective tax burden (Neumark Bericht 1962) and drafted directives several times (e.g. 1967, 
1975) in that direction (Genschel 2002b). In the 1990s the Commission redoubled its efforts: it 
                                                 
1
 For a more sophisticated analysis of tax-policy convergence in the EU see Kemmerling (2010). 
2
 EU-10 countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom. 
3
 OECD-11 countries are Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway,  
Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America. 
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endorsed a common minimum tax rate and even proposed a common definition of the tax base. 
So far these initiatives have led nowhere, as some member states have severe reservations about 
CIT harmonization. 
 
 
And yet, the EU was not without influence. On the one hand, it achieved some cooperation on 
preferential tax regimes and ‘harmful tax practices’ (Kemmerling and Seils 2009; Radaelli and 
Kraemer 2008). On the other hand, it paved the way for capital to harvest the gains from tax 
arbitrage (Cnossen, 2001): it made cross-border movements of firms easier through a number of 
directives such as the parent–subsidiary directive (Directive 90/435/EEC) or the merger directive 
(Directive 90/434/EEC). In addition, a battery of influential court rulings strengthened the 
position of multinational firms and weakened member states’ attempts to unilaterally defend 
their eroding corporate tax base (Genschel et al., 2011). Finally, as expected the reduction of 
investment risks dramatically spurred transnational movements of capital (Cnossen 2001).  
 
What does the data say? Table 2 shows some stylized information for CIT in OECD countries. 
We see that nominal tax rates have dramatically declined, but not the standard deviations. Mean 
ratios have increased in all countries, but in this case standard deviations have decreased in the 
EU. These facts imply two things: first CIT has followed the international trend of a rate cut with 
base broadening that more than compensated the losses in revenues; second there is some 
additional impact of the EU on absolute convergence in corporate tax ratios (and rates) as shown 
by the falling standard deviations. This finding is corroborated by the literature on conditional 
convergence (Genschel et al., 2011; Kemmerling 2010).  
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In qualitative terms the EU has a more visible impact. The table contains information on the way 
dividends are treated (Graetz and Warren 2007a). Taxing dividends produces two problems: first 
dividends may be taxed at the levels of firms or stock owners; second dividends of foreign stock 
owners may be taxed either in the country of the firm or the stock owner. Hence corporation tax 
systems are commonly differentiated by how they use dividend relief. The so-called classic 
system does not provide any relief, whereas imputation systems give shareholders a tax credit 
against their personal income tax. Apart from these two major systems there are also other 
techniques, such as taxing dividend income with a separate (scheduler) rate for personal income. 
Under the imputation system it is difficult to treat foreign and domestic shareholders equally. 
This discrimination has led the ECJ to effectively prohibit the use of the imputation system 
(Graetz and Warren 2007a). Table 2 shows that between 1981 and 2006 EU countries switched 
to (modified) classic systems or new hybrid forms, whereas imputation systems became the 
typical form of dividend treatment in the OECD-11. In fact, in 2006 none of the EU members 
except for the UK continued to operate an imputation system. Even the British imputation 
system had to be adjusted due to the interventions of the ECJ.
4
 This is a clear indication that 
imposition of judgments from the ECJ has a visible effect on the convergence of structural 
characteristics of tax systems in Europe. 
 
 
Personal Income Tax 
 
Personal income taxation (PIT) is a very complex issue since people may have very diverse 
forms of labor and capital income with different degrees of mobility. Due to these differences, 
                                                 
 
4
 See ECJ cases C-397/98 and 410/98 on Metallgesellschaft, Hoechst et al., of the year 2001. 
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countries are left with several trade-offs between efficiency, and vertical and horizontal equity 
(Ganghof 2006a). Countries have chosen different paths ranging from a flat tax treating all forms 
of income equally (e.g. Slovakia) to dual or scheduler income tax systems (Sweden). Again there 
are several arguments why countries have chosen these paths, but overall there is little 
convergence visible towards either of the extremes. On the contrary, domestic politics seems to 
be a major driving force that shapes tax policies in income taxation (Kemmerling 2009; Steinmo 
1993). 
 
As seen above, the EU has undertaken few direct steps at harmonizing income taxes. However, 
in as much as national legislation interferes with the four freedoms and the single market, income 
taxation is nowadays indirectly controlled by the EU. The clearest example are rulings by the 
ECJ (Genschel et al., 2008). Much of the stimulus of EU initiatives comes from the fact that 
interest income and dividend income, and thereby, corporate and personal income taxation, are 
tightly linked in an integrated economy. The EU has exacerbated the situation, since the abolition 
of interest rates and exchange rates in the monetary union have left tax arbitrage as the only 
meaningful form of arbitrage for interest income (Schratzenstaller 2003). It is therefore no 
wonder that the incidence of tax evasion and avoidance in this area is particularly high in 
Europe, and that it has narrowed the chances for tax savings unilaterally (Dehejia and Genschel 
1998). This has prompted the EU to undertake several initiatives to coordinate the taxation of 
interest income. Most prominently, the Council adopted the savings directive in 2004 which 
leaves member states with two options: they can either choose to exchange information on 
interest income or they can charge a minimum withholding tax at the source of the income 
(Holzinger 2005). It remains to be seen whether this cooperation will effectively confront some 
of the collective action problems in international savings taxation (Genschel and Schwarz 2011), 
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but the savings directive has so far been the most ambitious effort to harmonize part of national 
income taxation on the European level. 
 
What does the data say? Table 2 shows that the means and standard deviations of top marginal 
income tax rates have fallen in all countries. Ratios have remained roughly stable in all countries, 
again showing that rate-cuts-cum-base-broadening has been an international trend. Moreover, 
PIT systems have become somewhat simpler as the falling number of tax brackets shows. There 
is still a debate as to why tax progressivity has been in decline in recent years: global tax 
competition (Ganghof 2006a; Genschel 2002a), efficiency considerations (Swank 2006) or 
domestic politics (Kemmerling 2009). Either way, neither rates nor ratios speak for EU-induced 
policy convergence. What we do see, however, is that even before the savings directive, 
withholding taxes converged more visibly within the EU than in the rest of the OECD world.
5
 
This suggests that the EU and, in particular, the abolition of capital controls, made national 
deviations prohibitively costly and policy experiments need to be coordinated across EU 
countries, if not world wide.  
 
 
General Consumption Taxes 
 
In the case of general consumption taxes there are also important international trends unrelated to 
the EU. Value-added taxes (VAT) are arguably the most important tax innovation of the 20
th
 
century and have displaced most specific consumption taxes (Cnossen 1998). The spread of VAT 
has provoked a lot of scholarly debate on its origins. Across the world governments seem to have 
                                                 
5
 It has to be mentioned that national systems of savings taxation are very complex so that these country means are 
very delicate. We only used data on the taxation of bonds and only for clear cases of withholding  
taxes at the source of income. 
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learned about the efficiency, competitiveness, or the alleged ‘invisibility’ of VAT (Beramendi 
and Rueda 2007; Kanbur and Keen 2001; Kato 2003).  
 
Contrary to direct taxation, the EU has always been a key driving force of general and specific 
consumption taxes. Article 99 of the old EU treaty explicitly requires the harmonization of sales 
taxes and excises. In 1967 member states agreed on the conversion of sales taxes to VAT, but 
only ten years later did the EU pass the 6
th
 VAT directive. The latter adopted the destination 
principle to govern cross-border flows of goods and services. The directive also defined a 
minimum standard rate of 15 per cent and the use of reduced and maximum rates for certain 
products. Since then both EU legislation and jurisprudence have been very active in scrutinizing 
national tax systems and their compatibility with the four freedoms.  
 
This is also visible in Table 2. Nominal standard rates have increased in both EU and none-EU 
countries, but only in the EU have they also converged (Kemmerling 2010).  Yet, even the EU 
has so far not been successful in diminishing the use of reduced rates in old member states. The 
existing national exemptions were codified in the EU VAT directive of 1992. The EU was 
successful, however, in curtailing the use of super-rates for luxury and other goods which were at 
times as high as 110 per cent in Portugal. VAT ratios broadly move along the lines of VAT rates. 
As for the timing of the introduction, the EU clearly differs from the rest of the OECD. EU-10 
countries adopted VAT around 1972, whereas it took the rest of the OECD almost 15 more years 
to do so. And some countries such as the US still have not introduced VAT at all. These 
differences show the influence of EU harmonization on national systems of general consumption 
taxes. However, it is also true that the motives for complying with Europe differ greatly from 
country to country. Whereas Germany and France wanted to solve problems of cross-border 
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consumption and revenue generation, the UK embraced VAT as a substitute to inefficient and 
unpopular taxes, such as the selective employment tax (Kemmerling 2009). One may conclude 
that VAT may still be the dominant form of general consumption tax in Europe even without the 
EU, but the EU endorsement considerably speeded up its diffusion and partial convergence. 
 
 
Specific Consumption Taxes 
  
Excises have a long history, but in the 20
th
 century their relative importance declines 
considerably. Yet some excises, namely those on alcohol, tobacco and fuel are still important 
sources of public revenue. They also have an important regulatory function in addition to 
revenue collection. Since excises come in many different forms and with many different 
purposes, the foremost cause of international divergence lies in domestic politics. Specific 
consumption patterns differ widely across countries not least due to differences in cultural habits 
of drinking, smoking or driving (see e.g. Cnossen 2007). For all these reasons it is obvious that 
national trajectories in excise taxation have been very different and that national policy makers 
‘cherish’ their cultural peculiarities. If there are any common global trends in excise taxation 
they must be due to either ‘contagious’ technical innovations, such as the invention of ‘eco-
taxation’ (Heichel et al., 2005) or due to competitive pressures (Egger et al., 2005).  
  
Yet, competition and harmonization may matter much more within the EU. The harmonization 
of excises has always belonged to the mandate of the European Communities/EU. In the wake of 
the Single Market of 1992/3, the EU passed important directives, such as 02/84/EEC which 
replaced the old duty-free regime by a comparatively lenient system of regulating cross-border 
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shopping (Lockwood and Migali 2008). Moreover the directive introduced minimum excise 
duties on alcohol and tobacco and ruled that the standard VAT rate had to be applied to these 
goods. This also applies to fuel taxation. Finally, imposition by court rulings plays a role. The 
ECJ has made a number of influential decisions especially against the discriminatory taxation of 
domestic and foreign products containing alcohol (Cnossen 2007).  
 
Table 2 shows that tax revenues from all excises relative to GDP have been in decline in all 
countries, but that only EU countries have converged (but see Kemmerling 2010). If I arbitrarily 
focus on the rates for diesel taxes, we see that rates (in constant USD per liter) went up in all 
countries, and that they have diverged more strongly outside the EU. Evers et al., (2004) even 
find that harmonization has led to some upward convergence, but that competition within the EU 
remains strong. For excises on alcohol and cigarettes Lockwood and Migali (2008) find 
competition effects after the introduction of the single market in 1993. They conclude that 
economic competition on excises has significantly increased because of the deepening of 
European integration. However, it has to be noted that there is a marked upward trend in fuel, 
alcohol and cigarettes taxes which is somewhat at odds with Lockwood and Migali’s idea of 
strategic competition. In general, econometric studies do find country-level contagion, but it is 
not always clear whether this is due to simple competition or rather governments’ learning from 
each other in terms of the taxability of these items.  
  
Horizontal Diffusion of Tax Policies within the EU 
 
We have seen that there is mixed evidence for the role of the EU in creating policy convergence 
in different fields of taxation. But the impact of the EU may transcend any simple form of 
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convergence if it accelerates the international diffusion of tax policies between its member states. 
To test the relevance of different mechanisms of diffusion, I use the econometrics of spatial lag 
variables (Anselin 1988; Franzese and Hays 2007). A normal regression equation has a simple 
form of Pit = a + bk*Σxit + eit, where a is a constant, Pit is a (tax) policy for country i at time t, a 
batch of independent variables for each i and t, with the k regression coefficients b and an error 
term e. If you want to control for the possibility that countries affect each other, one can use a 
spatial lag, i.e. a weighted average of all other countries j excluding country i. Such a regression 
has the form Pit = a + bk*Σxit + dm*Σ(Wjt*Pjt)+ eit, where there are m regression coefficients for 
the spatial lags, Pjt are the tax policies for a given year for all other countries j, and Wjt are 
matrices with weights for the influence of each other country. Let us make an example. If we 
think that countries are more likely to copy policies of large economies such as the US than to 
copy policies of smaller economies, the W matrix may consist of the weights of each economy in 
the total GDP of all economies combined. This would suggest that, say, Belgium takes into 
consideration the tax policy of the US much more than the tax policy of the Netherlands. But 
there are other possibilities for the weights. 
 
In the following I use five different forms of W. The first one uses the notion of geographic 
proximity. In particular, I use a weight for contiguous countries. A country will take into 
consideration only those tax policies of neighboring countries.
6
 This variable has been used in 
the literature as a measure of exposure to economic competition in which distance matters. The 
second spatial lag uses the size of GDP as weights. These weights control for the problem of 
asymmetric influence of economically powerful countries. The third spatial lag uses GDP per 
capita as weights. Here, countries are more likely to copy policies of richer countries, possibly 
                                                 
6
 We have experimented with many different alternatives, such as normalizing the total number of bordering 
countries, using border length or using distances of the capitals in each country. Results are available on request. 
 Kemmerling, “EU’s Influence on National Tax Systems,” ACES Cases 2011.1, p. 20 
aiming at learning from those countries traditionally considered successful. The fourth spatial lag 
uses GDP growth as weights. Here countries are supposed to learn from those countries that have 
a particularly good recent performance in economic growth. Finally, the fifth spatial lag uses the 
ideological similarity between the home country and the other countries. The more similar a 
partisan government is compared to the home country, the more likely the home country’s 
government should learn from this country. I use the so-called Schmidt-index for the cabinet 
composition of parties (Armingeon et al., 2010) to calculate these weights. All five weights are 
related to the causal mechanisms of convergence and diffusion, but focus on different aspects of 
horizontal learning and competition.  
 
The dependent variables of the regressions are yearly changes in rates and ratios of corporate 
income, personal income, and value-added taxation. I include all EU countries for a time period 
of some 30 years (unbalanced panel). I use a random-effects model and robust standard errors to 
control for problems of pooled cross-sections and heteroscedasticity.
7
 One additional problem of 
spatial lags is that they are codetermined by the dependent variable, i.e. they are endogeneous. I 
use for all spatial-lag variables the value of the previous year to control for this. Franzese and 
Hays (2007) show that as long as this endogeneity is not overly strong, a normal regression 
equation with ordinary least squares is still feasible. Finally, I include a battery of control 
variables. Most importantly, I use the level of the dependent variable of the previous year which 
effectively controls for effects of catching up between different countries. Next, I include total 
population and GDP per capita to control for the size and wealth of each country. The share of 
people above 65 and the unemployment rate should control for the size of the dependent 
population and automatic adjustments of payroll taxes. Finally, there is one variable coding left, 
                                                 
7
 This is clearly insufficient since it does not control for fixed country or time effects. Unfortunately, there  
is no optimal solution in sight for these econometric problems (Beck 2011). 
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partisan governments and another one controlling for economic openness, i.e. imports and 
exports as a proportion of GDP. Again I use for all independent variables the values of the 
previous years. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the results of six different tax indicators for CIT, PIT and VAT. Due to the lack of 
fixed effects the model fit is very moderate. The dependent variable is always significant and 
negative, implying that there is some overall convergence in rates and ratios over time. In other 
words countries with smaller rates or ratios catch up with a rate of some five to ten percent per 
year, the exception being the CIT ratio with convergence up to 20 percent per year (see 
Kemmerling 2010 for details). As for the other control variables, larger countries see less growth 
in PIT or VAT, and richer countries see more growth in CIT rates and PIT ratios. Old-age 
increases CIT ratios and VAT rates, whereas unemployment rates only affect CIT ratios. 
Somewhat paradoxically, economic openness enhances CIT ratios, and decreases PIT rates and 
ratios, as well as VAT ratios. 
 
For our purposes the diffusion variables are much more relevant. We see some degree of 
competition between neighboring countries for CIT ratios. If neighboring countries decrease on 
average CIT ratios by one percentage point, the country will increase its ratio  
by some 0.1 percent. This effect is quite small but in line with the expectation of negative 
externalities between tax bases. However, there is a positive spillover effect in PIT for both rates 
and revenues. The effects of competition are less ambivalent for the spatial lag using the relative 
size of GDP. As expected both CIT rates and ratios are negatively affected. If the weighted 
average of all other countries increases by one percentage point, the respective country will 
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decrease its CIT rate by some two percent. We also see negative spillovers for the case of PIT 
ratios.  
 
On the other hand we see that learning also plays some role. Countries seem to copy CIT and 
PIT policies of those countries with higher GDP per capita. More importantly, countries with 
higher growth rates are more likely to be copied in their CIT rates and ratios. Somewhat 
surprisingly, countries react negatively to growth rates in the case of VAT rates, i.e. they rather 
copy countries with worse performance, but the effect is quite small. Finally, ideological 
closeness to the governing party only seems to matter in the case of the CIT rate. If other 
countries, weighted by ideological distance, increase their CIT rates by one percentage point, the 
respective country’s rate increases by a third of a percentage point. 
 
How about the influence of the EU on international diffusion? There are no easy ways to detect 
this, but one assumes that significant legal changes in the EU affect the speed and nature of 
diffusion across countries. One way to test this is to model structural breaks in the time series. 
Following Lockwood and Migali (2008), I test whether the single market in 1992 provides such a 
watershed. For that purpose I ran the same regressions as in Table 3 for the years from 1993 
onwards only (results available on request). Although it is difficult to perfectly identify the 
structural break in 1993, we see a strong increase of international policy diffusion after 1993. 
Almost all coefficients of the spatial-lag variables go up, some of them considerably and 
significantly. For CIT rates, for instance, the coefficients of the border-weighted and the GDP-
weighted lags are now significant and negative, as expected. VAT rates now are also 
significantly influenced by spatial lags using the size of GDP and the growth rates as weights.   
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Conclusion: The Diffusion Nobody Talks About 
 
The article shows the diverse impact of EU activities on national tax policies. Several findings 
are worth repeating. First, the output of EU institutions in terms of information, legislation and 
jurisprudence has increased tremendously in the field of taxation, in particular after 1992. 
Combined with indirect effects mainly coming from market integration, the EU nowadays deeply 
penetrates national tax policies. Its actual impact, however, depends on the specific form of 
taxation and the aspect of the tax structure under scrutiny. Whereas, for instance, the EU seems 
to stimulate competition in CIT, it has significantly harmonized VAT systems. At times, this 
leads to visible policy convergence. But more than often, the EU makes systems diverge, or 
converge conditionally. The study of international policy diffusion within the EU shows that the 
EU seems to have accelerated processes of competition and learning, especially after 1992. 
 
All things considered, the EU questions the tax sovereignty of its member states, arguably much 
more than international trends of competition and policy learning do. The mix of direct and 
indirect activities, as well as the different causal channels the EU uses, are far beyond the means 
of any other international organization. At the same time, little does the European public opinion 
know about the influence of the EU. The national arena is still the exclusive forum for tax policy 
debates. Ironically, national politicians at times make proposals such as special exemptions for 
VAT that ceased to be feasible on the national level a long time ago (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 
2010). Without public attention it is unlikely though that tax policy is going to be politicized on 
the supranational level (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Under these circumstances, two options for 
tax policy in the EU remain. First, the EU could not only harmonize existing national tax systems 
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even more, but introduce its own taxes. The Commission recurrently puts this issue on the 
agenda, but member states have been very reluctant to cede authority to the supranational level. 
And yet, if the old idea of no-taxation-without-representation bears fruits, lifting taxes to the EU-
level will lead to a new level of political contestation in EU institutions. Second, the EU could 
delegate important tasks of taxation back to the level of member states. Some legal scholars 
already argue that the ECJ has gone too far (Graetz and Warren 2007b). Balancing the norm of 
anti-discrimination against the public interest of national revenue generation is an important 
aspect in such a recalibration of competences.  
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Table 1 Direct EU activities in the field of taxation 
 
 Information Legislation Jurisprudence 
 58-80 81-07 58-77 78-07 58-77 78-07 
by tax area  
VAT 6 84 8.5 197.5 18 357.5 
Excise and other 
indirect tax 
14 28 7.5 110.5 21 219.5 
Corporate tax 3 27 0 5 1 56.5 
Personal tax 3 15 0 11 3 68.5 
Administrative 
Cooperation and 
miscellaneous tax 
8 17 6 36 0 12 
Total  30 134 22 360 43 714 
 
Sources and notes: 
Information contains recommendations, resolutions, communications, opinions and selected reports of the Council 
and the Commission. For earlier years data comes from own research in the archives of the Council and the 
Commission. For later years I also used information from prelex and eurlex databases and information from DG 
TAXUD. 
Legislation contains directives, regulations and decisions (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2010). 
Jurisprudence contains rulings of the ECJ (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2010). 
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Table 2: Trends in Tax Indicators between 1981 and 2006 
  EU-10 OECD-11 
  Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
CIT Rates -17.11 0.46 -16.23 0.90 
 Ratios 1.26 -0.5 1.58 1.40 
 Other Full imputation disappears Full imputation en vogue 
Major Causal Mechanism Competition, Imposition Competition 
PIT Rates -17.97 -0.97 -24.47 -13.46 
 Ratios 0.44 0.06 -1.23 -0.95 
 Other Less brackets, convergence 
in withholding taxes 
Less brackets, no 
convergence in withholding 
taxes 
Major Causal Mechanism (Competition, Learning) Competition, Learning 
VAT Rates 2.47 -1.59 0.13 1.31 
 Ratios 0.56 0.64 1.79 2.44 
 Other Early Introduction Later Introduction 
Major Causal Mechanism Harmonization, Learning (Learning) 
Other 
indicators 
Rates 
(diesel) 
0.37 0.06 0.30 0.26 
 Ratios -0.7 -1.25 -0.99 0.7 
 Other  Number of excises on 
decline 
. 
Major Causal Mechanism Harmonization (Learning) (Competition, Learning) 
Note: The numbers are the differences between group-specific means or standard deviations for EU-10 or OECD-11 
countries between 1981 and 2006. Causal mechanisms in parentheses are less evident than those without. 
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Table 3 Diffusion of Tax Policies between EU Countries 
 
 ∆ CIT 
rate 
∆ CIT 
ratio 
∆ top PIT 
rate 
∆ top PIT 
ratio 
∆ VAT 
rate 
∆ VAT 
ratio 
Control Variables 
Dependent(t-1) -0.10*** -0.18*** -0.074*** -0.10*** -0.057* -0.061*** 
 (0.017) (0.0046) (0.019) (0.014) (0.031) (0.018) 
Population(t-1) -7.0e-09 4.4e-09 -6.5e-08** -2.9e-
08*** 
4.5e-09 -4.4e-09** 
 (1.3e-08) (3.4e-09) (2.8e-08) (6.0e-09) (6.9e-09) (2.1e-09) 
GDP per cap.(t-1) 9.1e-07* -4.8e-08 1.3e-06 6.2e-07*** -5.8e-
07** 
3.2e-08 
 (5.5e-07) (1.2e-07) (9.8e-07) (1.6e-07) (2.7e-07) (7.0e-08) 
Left 
Government(t-1) 
0.0020 -0.00058 0.00086 -0.00070 0.0012 0.00027 
 (0.0031) (0.00049) (0.0037) (0.00077) (0.0028) (0.00050) 
Unemployment(t-1) -0.029 0.017** -0.042 -0.00043 0.066 0.0041 
 (0.040) (0.0071) (0.035) (0.011) (0.046) (0.0049) 
Economic 
openness(t-1) 
-0.00036 0.0039*** -0.014*** -0.0054*** 0.00074 -0.0013* 
 (0.0047) (0.0015) (0.0037) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.00074) 
Old-age 
Population(t-1) 
-0.10 0.036** -0.14 -0.014 0.11** 0.0089 
 (0.11) (0.017) (0.095) (0.032) (0.048) (0.012) 
Diffusion Variables 
Borders(t-1) -0.0014 -0.0011* 0.0071*** 0.0022** -0.00032 0.0013 
 (0.0030) (0.00062) (0.0023) (0.00087) (0.0051) (0.0011) 
GDP(t-1) -0.017* -0.0023* -0.0047 -0.0021* -0.0082 -0.00044 
 (0.0087) (0.0014) (0.0051) (0.0013) (0.0060) (0.0017) 
GDP per cap.(t-1) -0.016 0.014*** 0.13* 0.029** 0.040 -0.0030 
 (0.021) (0.0048) (0.074) (0.013) (0.053) (0.013) 
GDP growth(t-1) 1.2e-
08*** 
1.4e-09* -5.2e-10 -4.4e-10 -1.1e-
08*** 
5.6e-10 
 (4.2e-09) (7.5e-10) (2.3e-09) (5.6e-10) (1.9e-09) (4.2e-10) 
Government 
Ideology(t-1) 
0.37*** 0.020 -0.034 0.010 0.063 -0.00062 
 (0.11) (0.020) (0.082) (0.020) (0.086) (0.021) 
Constant 0.34 -0.49 5.03** 1.36 -0.61 0.61*** 
 (2.39) (0.46) (2.46) (0.84) (0.63) (0.21) 
Observations 465 465 465 465 465 465 
Number of 
countries 
15 15 15 15 15 15 
R
2
 0.13 0.78 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.07 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Appendix:  
 
Table A-1: Corporate Tax Rates, Ratios and Systems in 1981 and 2006 
 
 Nominal Rate Ratio System
1
 
 1981 2006 1981 2006 1981 2006 
EU-10       
Mean/ Mode 47.09 29.98 2.33 3.59 I C,O 
Std. Dev. 6.14 6.60 1.26 0.73   
Coeff. Var. 0.13 0.22 0.54 0.20   
OECD-11       
Mean/ Mode 45.48 29.25 3.20 4.78 O I 
Std. Dev. 6.50 7.40 1.86 3.24   
Coeff. Var. 0.14 0.25 0.58 0.68   
Note: own calculations on the basis of OECD tax database. 
1 System of Dividend Treatment: Mode in EU-10 and OECD-11 respectively. I = Imputation 
System, C = Classic System, O = Other.  
 
 
Table A-2 Indicators of Personal Income taxation for 1981 and 2006 
 
 Top Nominal 
Rate 
Ratio No. of 
Brackets 
Withholding Tax 
 1981 2006 1981 2006 1981 2006 1985 2002 
EU-10         
Mean 64.16 46.19 10.42 10.86 13.38 4.56 13.75 16.90 
Std. Dev. 7.36 6.39 5.14 5.20 9.41 2.36 13.19 10.85 
Coef. Var. 0.11 0.14 0.49 0.48 0.70 0.52 0.96 0.64 
OECD-11         
Mean 69.12 44.65 10.28 9.05 11.71 4.00 13.75 18.33 
Std. Dev. 17.86 4.40 4.92 3.97 8.12 1.33 17.02 17.56 
Coef. Var. 0.26 0.10 0.48 0.44 0.69 0.33 1.24 0.96 
Note: own calculations on the basis of OECD tax database and (BMF 1985; Schratzenstaller 
2003) for withholding taxes. 
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Table A-3 Standard and Reduced VAT Rates, Ratios and Year of Introduction 
 
 Nominal Rate Reduced Rates Ratio Year of 
Introduction 
 1980 2006 1980 2006 1980 2006  
EU-10        
Mean 16.84 19.31 4.81 4.71 5.88 6.44 1971.80 
Std. Dev. 4.27 2.68 2.89 1.45 1.97 2.61 5.46 
Coeff. Var. 0.25 0.14 0.60 0.31 0.34 0.41  
OECD-11        
Mean 13.33 13.46 5.00 3.67 3.36 5.15 1986.20 
Std. Dev. 5.77 7.08 0.00 3.79 1.96 2.40 8.78 
Coeff. Var. 0.43 0.53 0.00 1.03 0.58 0.47  
 Notes: own calculations on the basis of OECD tax database. 
 
 
Table A-4 Ratios for all Excise Taxes and Rates on Diesel taxation 
 
 Ratio 81 Ratio 06 Diesel tax rate 80 Diesel tax rate 05 
EU-10     
Mean 4.49 3.79 0.12 0.49 
Std. Dev. 1.86 0.61 0.09 0.15 
Coeff. Var. 0.41 0.16 0.72 0.30 
OECD-11     
Mean 4.73 3.74 0.03 0.33 
Std. Dev. 1.58 2.28 0.05 0.31 
Coeff. Var. 0.33 0.61 1.72 0.93 
Notes: own calculations on the basis of OECD tax database and International Energy Agency 
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